Playing it Safe? The Costs and Adverse Effects of Counterterrorism. by Öhnell, David
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Playing it Safe? 
The Costs and Adverse Effects of Counterterrorism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
David Öhnell 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2nd Term Paper 
Human Rights Studies 
Autumn 2008 
 
Supervisor: Dr. Olof Beckman 
 
 Abstract 
 
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate international counterterrorism efforts to estimate their 
costs and potential adverse effects over time. An underlying presumption of the study is that 
flawed counterterrorism measures to some extent are counterproductive, and building on this 
idea a comparison is made between the distinguishing features of the ‘War on Terror’ and an 
alternative model in the form of The UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. It is the argument 
of this paper that although it is difficult to speculate on future results, the Global Strategy 
constitutes a more promising approach for counterterrorism. The ‘War on Terror’ contains 
measures that violate human rights and damage legitimacy, and as such risk a backlash and an 
increase in terrorist recruitments, while the Global Strategy focuses on building bottom-up and 
addressing the root causes of terrorism in a wider, more thoroughly planned, long-term 
perspective. 
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1 Introduction 
“Our responses to terrorism, as well as our efforts to thwart it and prevent it, should uphold 
the human rights that terrorists aim to destroy. Human rights, fundamental freedoms and the 
rule of law are essential tools in the effort to combat terrorism – not privileges to be 
sacrificed at a time of tension.”1  
 
Since the attacks in the United States of America on 11 September 2001 combating terrorism has 
risen to the top of the global policy agenda. The framework for this combat has predominantly 
been that of a war, and the struggle has thus been dubbed a ‘War on Terror’.2 The line of thought 
expressed in the quote above by Kofi Annan captures quite well the underlying idea of this paper: 
if human rights are to be defended against terrorism, then the same human rights must be 
emphasized in the process. With this as a starting point the purpose of this paper is to evaluate 
international counterterrorism efforts. An underlying presumption of the study is that flawed 
counterterrorism measures to some extent are counterproductive, and this is also the reason 
behind this subject’s relevance. Led by the US the ‘War on Terror’ has been setting the standard 
for international policies over the last seven years, with hitherto few signs of decline. With voices 
echoing concern over the lack of respect for human rights within this military model of 
combating terrorism, it is imperative for the subject of human rights studies to review this model 
and evaluate the prospects of a future policy change. In examining the cost and adverse effects of 
counterterrorism, this is the area that I strive to clarify. 
1.1 Research Questions 
The overarching question for this paper is: What are the factual and alternative costs over time of 
international counterterrorism? To examine this issue and to reach an answer in line with the 
stated purpose, a number of sub-questions are posed: What are the defining traits of the ‘War on 
Terror’? What distinguishes the alternative model for combating terrorism? Why does it seem a 
problematic situation, moving from the war model to the Global Strategy? What are the 
implications of the time factor?  
                                                
1 Kofi Annan, then United Nations Secretary-General, speaking at the First UN Counter-Terrorism Committee 
Special Meeting, 6 march 2003, as cited in Schmid, Alex P., ‘Terrorism and Human Rights: A Perspective from the 
United Nations’, in Ranstorp, Magnus and Wilkinson, Paul (eds.), Terrorism and Human Rights, p. 24. 
2 This term is used to characterize the global war on terrorism instigated by the Bush administration(s) in the wake of 
the attacks on 11 September 2001. Because of this close identification with such specific policies, and for 
clarification, I follow the path laid down by Wilson (2005) and others with him, in keeping the term within quotation 
marks throughout the paper. 
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1.2 Method 
The method applied in this paper is a form comparative case study, the two cases being the war 
model and the alternative model for counterterrorism. It is, however, not simply put an empirical 
comparison. Instead, empirical examples are used as data to identify the distinguishing features of 
the ‘War on Terror’. These features will then serve as a basis for a comparison between this war 
model of counterterrorism and the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy3. The 
result of that comparison, in turn, lays out the groundwork for an evaluation and a discussion of 
the respective models’ consequences and possible adverse effects over time.  
1.3 Theory and Material 
The subject of human rights and civil liberties in the ‘War on Terror’ is extensively covered in the 
plethora of literature on terrorism that has been produced since 9/11. To be an issue of global 
reach the representation of different actors and states in the literature is highly asymmetrical, the 
obvious example being the wide coverage of American policies – often by American writers. I 
make use of the scrutiny afforded in these works, which is the reason why this (over-) 
representation of the United States is evident in this paper as well. This is due to necessity; the 
focus on the ‘War on Terror’ entails large focus on the US, it being to great extent the American 
response to 9/11. Thus, this paper is not intended as an investigation of US policies as such, but 
as a study of the dominating trends distinguishing the ‘War on Terror’. On the face of it the 
appearance, then, might be that of a slanted approach. However, I would argue that for the 
subject of human rights studies there is (or at least should be) nothing controversial in the claim 
that many of the measures undertaken in the ‘War on Terror’ are egregious and detrimental to the 
system of international human rights law. It is my opinion that efficiency is better achieved by 
adhering to existing fundamental principles, rather than steering away from them. It is necessary, 
if defending and strengthening human rights is an objective, to examine closely the practices that 
carry the risk of leading to the opposite. Therefore, although still trying to uphold some vigilance 
in my reading, I view the existing literature as an enriching source and as a good starting point for 
the present study. Human rights, no matter if codified in law or not, are not neutral and neither 
can their defence be.  
The material elaborated on above mainly consists of secondary sources; academic accounts 
and investigations on the subject of human rights, produced mainly within the Anglo-American 
academic sphere. The group of authors is made up of scholars of different status, mostly from 
the subjects of law and political science, as well as practitioners of human rights – more often 
than not with affiliations to the UN. In addition to these sources some primary material is also 
used and interpreted, such as international treaties, UN declarations, resolutions and the like. 
1.4 Terminology 
Given that focus is placed on actions associated with the ‘War on Terror’, some important 
distinctions need to be made. First of all, as implied above, I make a distinction between different 
                                                
3 Hereafter called the Global Strategy. 
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counterterrorism models. By illustrating efforts made since 9/11 I will try to identify the general 
tendencies in the response to these terrorist act. This, then, will focus on the ‘War on Terror’. 
When writing about ‘counterterrorism’ I refer to this phenomenon in general. The third and last 
distinction to be made is the alternative model presented, the Global Strategy. This structure is a 
conscious choice to distinguish clearly between the objects of study, that is, the specific measures 
undertaken in the ‘War on Terror’ and the more holistic approach respectively. 
Another issue concerning the terminology is the fact that one can distinguish between 
different types of terrorism. For example there is the distinction made by Magnus Ranstorp and 
Paul Wilkinson writing about ‘New Terrorism’4, a sub-state type of terrorism where al Qaeda is 
the archetype. Their purpose is to separate this relatively new phenomenon from ‘traditional’ 
terrorist groups and regime terror. However, this paper focuses on the responses to rather than 
the incidents of terrorism. As such, this distinction does not affect the work in other ways than 
the fact that the models presented could and perhaps should be understood as created within a 
context where ‘New Terrorism’ constitutes the major perceived threat. 
1.5 Delimitations 
The focus on the ‘War on Terror’ effectively sets the boundaries for the time period covered in 
this paper. As a natural consequence focus is on the situation from 11 September 2001 onward. 
However, these limitations are not absolute, as some historical developments and descriptive 
comparisons to past events are presented. 
This paper does not, and cannot, claim to be exhaustive – neither in its investigation of 
counterterrorism models or in its account of measures undertaken thus far. Counterterrorism, 
namely, can be done in many shapes and sizes; on so many levels by different actors with 
different focus and to different degrees with different aspirations. Thus, a complete account 
stretches far beyond the limits and focus as stated in the purpose.  
 
                                                
4 Ranstorp, Magnus and Wilkinson, Paul, ‘Introduction’, in Ranstorp, Magnus and Wilkinson, Paul (eds.), p. xvii. 
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2 The Defining Traits of the ‘War on Terror’ 
In the aftermath of the attacks on 11 September 2001, the UN Security Council created the 
international framework for countering terrorism. Resolution 1373, adopted unanimously on 28 
September 2001, sets the agenda for all member states, and in line with the powers given to the 
Security Council in the UN Charter lays binding obligations upon the member states.5 The 
proposed counterterrorism framework is a sound starting point for an evaluation of undertaken 
measures.  
In resolution 1373 international terrorism is said to constitute a threat to international peace 
and security – the phrasing opening up the toolbox of Charter Chapter VII at the hands of the 
council – and is fiercely condemned. Countering that threat the right to self-defence, as a 
response, is reaffirmed.6 Specific measures to carry out are, inter alia: to prevent and suppress the 
financing of such acts, by criminalizing the collection of funds to and freezing assets of people 
with terrorist affiliations7; the states themselves should refrain from providing support to terrorist 
acts, which includes suppressing recruitment, and also bring terrorists and sponsors to justice and 
deny them safe havens, as well as prevent movement by more effective border controls8; also, 
member states should increase their cooperation and information exchange, as well as become 
parties to existing international conventions dealing with terrorism.9 
The range of the framework established in resolution 1373 is broad, which is indicative of 
the gravity of the situation experienced in the aftermath of the attacks. In hindsight the most 
telling is the notable absence of human rights in the resolution; it is only mentioned in one 
paragraph, concerning measures to be undertaken before granting refugee status.10 The overall 
situation at that time can be characterized as one in which the extreme situation required extreme 
measures. This would become true also in practice, as the measures were to be extended far 
beyond the provisions of the resolution. Case in point is the American response to the attacks – a 
policy in which human rights were separated from security matters and removed. The priority on 
national security trumped these rights concerns.11  
To take counterterrorism to a theoretical level Alex P. Schmid characterizes two models 
available for policy makers when responding: a military response and a criminal justice ditto. 
“The military attempts to use maximum force to overwhelm an opponent within a framework of 
the laws of war, while the police try to use minimal force within a framework of the rule of law.”12 
                                                
5 Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, Article 25 and 48(1). 
6 UN Doc. S/RES/1373, 28 September 2001, Preamble. 
7 Ibid., Article 1. 
8 Ibid., Article 2(a), 2(c), 2(e) and 2(g). 
9 Ibid., Article 3(a)-(d). 
10 Ibid., Article 3(f). 
11 Wilson, Richard Ashby, ‘Human Rights in the ‘War on Terror’’, in Wilson, Richard Ashby (ed.), Human Rights in the 
‘War on Terror’, p. 6f. 
12 Schmid, Alex P., in Ranstorp, Magnus and Wilkinson, Paul (eds.), p. 18 (italics in original). 
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These, however, can be seen as ideal scenarios and as such models to aim for, since in reality the 
mentioned frameworks have proven to be both fluid and easily ignored. 
2.1 Legislation and Military Action 
On the domestic level the ‘War on Terror’ has been characterized by efforts with the intended 
purpose of increasing the capability of finding and apprehending suspected terrorists. The almost 
immediate American response to the terrorist attacks they had suffered on 11 September 2001, 
starting with some propositions as early as two days after the attacks13, was extensive legislative 
changes. Internationally the most distinguishing has been the treatment of detainees and 
interrogation techniques used. 
2.1.1 Legislative Response in the United States 
The USA PATRIOT Act14 was the first major antiterrorism tool passed in the US. The 342-page 
document was proposed eight days after 9/11 and passed another five weeks later, on 26 
October 2001. When voted upon, on 12 October, no possibility of amendment was given, and 
thus none of the provisions were open for debate.15 The purpose of the act, in light of the recent 
attacks, was pre-emptive, to make sure that no new attacks would occur, and its aim was fivefold: 
to improve information sharing between law enforcement and foreign intelligence agencies, 
gather antiterrorism intelligence, expand wiretap authority, prevent funding of terrorist activities, 
and to impose mandatory detention and deportation of non-citizens suspected of terrorist 
affiliations.16 One of the more controversial aspects was the possibility of law enforcement in any 
criminal investigation – that is, not only investigations pertaining to terrorism prevention – to 
perform so-called ‘secret searches’; a search and seizure of a suspect’s property with notification 
being made only afterwards. Such methods stand in contrast with ordinary practice where a 
warrant must be obtained beforehand, and this naturally results in a substantial widening of the 
surveillance available to (all) law enforcement agencies.17 Another aspect of the act is the 
loosening of the restrictions on giving warrants for gathering intelligence on a foreign power, also 
carrying with it a noticed side effect in the potential for this information seeping into ordinary 
federal law enforcement for domestic purposes of prevention.18 Furthermore, the new crime of 
domestic terrorism was created, with a definition so broad as to include “acts dangerous to 
human life” carried out with intent to influence the government’s policies. Providing assistance, 
                                                
13 Sidel, Mark, More Secure, Less Free? Antiterrorism Policy & Civil Liberties after September 11, 2004, p. 9. 
14 This common title is an acronym for the full title that reads ‘Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing 
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act’. 
15 Donohue, Laura K., The Cost of Counterterrorism: Power, Politics and Liberty, p. 1f. 
16 Banks, Christopher P., ‘Protecting (or Destroying) Freedom through Law: The USA PATRIOT Act’s 
Constitutional Implications’, in Cohen, David B., and Wells, John W. (eds.), American National Security and Civil 
Liberties in an Era of Terrorism, p. 29ff. 
17 Ibid., p, 37; Sidel, Mark, p. 12. 
18 Banks, Christopher, P., in Cohen, David B., and Wells, John W. (eds.), p. 38f.  
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without involvement in the actual domestic terrorist act, would also serve as a sufficient ground 
for prosecution.19 
In all examples presented above the authorities are given greater powers, but with vague 
limitations, and as a result, the USA PATRIOT Act’s wide reaching measures to prevent further 
terrorist crimes creates potential for major invasions of the individuals’ rights and liberties. The 
same applies to the wider measures of surveillance that was introduced later on. In 2002 came the 
initiation of the Total Information Awareness (TIA), a programme immensely comprehensive 
with the aim to link together every government and commercial database over the world. With all 
the data gathered in one place it would then search and uncover patterns that might indicate an 
upcoming terrorist attack. Stirring up major public opinions reacting to this invasion of privacy, 
the programme was renamed in 2003 to Terrorism Information Awareness. However, it became 
clear that not much was different in the new version, and thus Congress cut its funding later that 
same year. Still, many of the ongoing TIA projects were transferred to other intelligence agencies, 
inter alia the National Security Agency, and so could continue to operate.20  
2.1.2 Change in Immigration Policies 
In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11-attacks the administration of President George W. Bush 
initiated a process of preventive detention that over time has resulted in over five thousand 
people being detained. The target group for these measures to a great extent was Arab and 
Muslim foreign nationals. Many were held in secret waiting for immigration proceedings, and 
some who agreed to leave the country were still subject to a policy of ‘hold until cleared’ and kept 
in arrest. This sweeping action did not produce notable results; practically everyone was cleared, 
and, contrary to the main purpose of the imposed measures, not one of the detainees was 
convicted of a terrorist crime.21 To this there can be added the adoption of a zero-tolerance 
immigration policy, trying to prevent new attacks by finding potential terrorists through focusing 
on immigrants and visitors mainly from Arab and Muslim countries. The Special Registration 
programme, as it was called, required 80,000 men to register with photograph and fingerprint. 
The total number of people, including the ones preventively detained and also another eight 
thousand young, mostly Arab and Muslim, men called in for interview with the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, is 93,000 – and still, the number of terrorist convictions is zero.22  
The result of actions like the ones above is many innocent people getting caught up in the 
searches. They are merely collateral damages; a risk that comes with the nature of the task. Similar 
results have also been the outcome of the British use of indefinite detention of suspected 
terrorists, which has shown to be used exclusively against Muslim men and thus has created 
resentment and alienation within the Muslim community.23 At some point the legitimate 
                                                
19 Sidel, Mark, p. 11. 
20 Donohue, Laura K., p. 257f. 
21 Cole, David and Lobel, Jules, Less Safe, Less Free: Why America is Losing the War on Terror, p. 37f.; Sidel, Mark, p. 16f. 
22 Cole, David and Lobel, Jules, p. 107. 
23 Fenwick, Helen and Phillipson, Gavin, ‘Legislative over-breadth, democratic failure and the judicial response: 
fundamental rights and the UK’s anti-terrorist legal policy’, in Ramraj, Victor V., Hor, Michael and Roach, Kent 
(eds.), Global Anti-Terrorism Law and Policy, p. 456. 
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measures to prevent a new attack crosses the line and becomes possibly illegitimate acts with 
worrying tendencies of racial profiling and discrimination. This is especially remarkable when 
relating it to the status of non-discrimination in human rights. Such provisions generally require 
states not only to abstain from discriminating, but to work against it. It constitutes a positive 
obligation upon the state.24 The step from having to ensure realization of a right to violating it is 
noteworthy. 
2.1.3 The United Kingdom: Legislation and Derogation 
The United Kingdom saw a similarly quick and extensive legislative response in the wake of the 
attacks. Despite the fact that the attacks were committed on US territory, it was in number of 
British casualties the most serious terrorist attack in British history. This lead to the passing of the 
Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and Security Act (ATCSA) even though an extensive review of the 
existing provisions, as well as passing of new permanent counterterrorism law, had been 
performed merely seven months prior to the attack.25 
One part of the British domestic response was the reintroduction of the practice of 
indefinite (or ‘executive’) detention – a revived model previously utilized in Northern Ireland, 
where its usage had ended in the 1970s.26 This method was based on the powers, given to the 
Home Secretary in accordance with the ATSCA, to ‘certify’ foreign individuals as being suspected 
terrorists. The primary aim of such an act was the deportation of the suspect, but where for some 
reason that alternative was prevented detention remained an option. Being a state party, the UK 
formally derogated the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) – more specifically from article 5(1) – due to the sensitivity of 
the matter.27 Derogations are not to be taken lightly and are therefore riddled with criteria that 
are subject for inquiry. For the evaluation of the plausibility of the derogation the measures must 
be viewed in light of principles of necessity and proportionality requirements, given the 
limitations imposed on individual liberties. In the case of Britain, those having done so have also 
objected on precisely these aspects.28  
2.1.4 Treatment of Detainees 
In a military order on 13 November 2001, President Bush issued a military order in which 
indefinite detention of non-citizens was initiated. These were furthermore to be tried by military 
commissions where, due to practical reasons, generally recognized principles of law and rules of 
evidence would not be applied.29 The location where this was to take place was Guantánamo Bay, 
                                                
24 Duffy, Helen,The ‘War on Terror’ and the Framework of International Law, p. 366ff. 
25 Donohue, Laura K., p. 11, 57. 
26 Ibid., p. 47, 57. 
27 Ibid., p. 58; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 November 
1950, Article 5(1) stipulates the right to liberty and security. 
28 Duffy, Helen, p. 348. 
29 Donohue, Laura K., p. 71f. 
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Cuba, which according to then Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, was “the least worst” of 
possible places available for consideration.30 
In establishing the camps at Guantánamo Bay, the Bush administration suspended the 
application of the Geneva Conventions to the detainees. In the memos discussing these measures 
one explanatory reason was that something like the ‘War on Terror’ was simply unforeseen in the 
creation of the conventions, which meant that they could not be applied.31 The non-application 
concerned both al Qaeda and the Taliban, and the effect was that the detainees were regarded 
‘enemy combatants’ and as such exempt from prisoner of war status and the required standards 
of treatment it entails.32 Something practised and developed at Guantánamo Bay were certain 
forms of coercive interrogation. These were tried here and in Afghanistan, and later transferred 
and worsened to the degree of full-fledged torture in Iraq. The result, in the end, was the famous 
Abu Ghraib scandal where a number of awful methods were used. Thus, in the environments 
where prisoner of war status was denied the initial harsh interrogations turned into a slippery 
slope that ended in a human rights disaster.33 
The major justification for the measures of the ‘War on Terror’ has been that it serves the 
purpose and goal of prevention. The detainees are held indefinitely with this aim rather than that 
of bringing them to justice; to a great extent they are imprisoned not because of past 
wrongdoings but to prevent future such acts. As acknowledged by Rumsfeld, the purpose is “first 
to keep the enemy off the battlefield so that they can’t kill more innocent people. […] [O]nly last, 
is the issue of punishment an issue”.34 Prevention is the keyword. 
To the extent that punishment actually has been of interest, the method used to bring the 
detainees to justice is military commissions, or tribunals as they are also called. These too were 
established with the 13 November 2001 military order.35 The power of the President to create 
this kind of commissions is established by practice and is performed either by Congress or by the 
President with approval from the Congress. It is possible also by the President alone – something 
more controversial, but which has been affirmed by the Supreme Court. This practice builds on 
the precedent set in cases in the mid-twentieth century, related to incidents during the Second 
World War and the treatment of arrested German saboteurs.36 Then, like now, the commissions’ 
role of ensuring justice was subject of dispute. 
2.1.5 Critique 
The military commissions are sometimes called military, or special, courts; they are the judicial 
power within their limited area of jurisdiction. This name has nonetheless raised objections. 
Geoffrey Robertson means that the word ‘court’ should not be used, since these commissions are 
                                                
30 Donald Rumsfeld, as cited in Donohue, Laura K., p. 72. 
31 Ibid., p. 76f. 
32 Ibid., p. 80. 
33 Ibid., p. 96-99. 
34 Donald Rumsfeld, 13 February 2004, as cited in Cole, David and Lobel, Jules, p. 28f. 
35 Stephens, Jr., Otis H., ‘Presidential Power, Judicial Deference, and the Status of Detainees in an Age of 
Terrorism’, in Cohen, David B. and Wells, John W. (eds.), p. 71f. 
36 Ibid., p. 73ff. 
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simply extensions of the executive power. With a panel consisting of military officers, often 
without legal qualification or experience, the judges are employed by the same authority that is in 
charge of the detention and prosecution.37 A court should be independent, and the commissions 
are not. 
The use of military commissions for terrorist suspects can also be found in Egypt. There it 
has been subject to similar critique, from the UN Human Rights Committee, due to the lack of 
independency of such courts and that their decision are not subject for appeal.38 Both these 
aspects are incompatible with the provisions of the ICCPR. 
Furthermore, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) are also worried 
by the use of this kind of procedure. It is their opinion that “military courts may not try civilians, 
except when no civilian courts exist or where trial by such courts is materially impossible. Even 
under such circumstances, the IACHR has pointed out that the trial must respect the minimum 
guarantees established under international law”.39  
The issue of torture goes beyond talk about applying the Geneva Conventions or not; its 
status is the same in both the laws of war and the laws of peace. Freedom from torture is a non-
derogable right according to ICCPR, forbidden in all forms according to the Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and in customary 
law regarded as a peremptory jus cogens norm.40 It is a serious enough deed to potentially amount 
to a crime against humanity, if widespread and systematic and directed towards civilians.41 In 
other words, torture is widely acknowledged as one of the most serious human rights violations, 
and consequently strongly prohibited in international law.  
Heavy criticism has been presented in a large number of NGO reports against the measures 
undertaken. The US are, among other things, criticized for their policies at Guantánamo Bay, 
focusing on that detainees are being held, some of them for more than six years, without charge; 
they are prevented from using habeas corpus petitions to investigate the lawfulness of their 
detention; and the procedures of the military fall short of recognized standards of due process.42 
The international norms regarding these aspects to be found in human rights law are quite clear. 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) establishes the right of every 
individual to freedom from arbitrary arrest or detention, as well as the rights to being promptly 
brought before a judge and to be entitled to a court assessment of the lawfulness of the 
detention.43 These are precisely the provisions being denied at Guantánamo Bay. Article 4 of the 
ICCPR presents the state parties to the convention with the right to derogate from its provisions 
                                                
37 Robertson, Geoffrey, ‘Fair Trials for Terrorists?’, in Wilson, Richard Ashby (ed.), p. 174f. 
38 UN Doc. CCPR/CO/76/EGY, 28 November 2002, Para. 16(b). 
39 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Terrorism and Human Rights, 12 December 2001, available at 
<http://www.cidh.org/Terrorism/Eng/part.t.htm>  
40 Brownlie, Ian, Principles of Public International Law, p. 596f.; Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 10 December 1984, 1465 UNTS 113, Article 2(2) and 2(3) states that no 
exceptional circumstances or order from a superior can ever justify the use of torture. 
41 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, 2187 UNTS 3, Article 7(1). 
42 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2008, p. 540f. 
43 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171, Article 9(1), 9(2) and 
9(4). 
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(with a few exceptions) during a time of emergency.44 However, as made clear by the UN Human 
Rights Committee, this does not apply to the freedom from arbitrary detention. It is regarded as a 
peremptory norm, and is as such an inalienable right no matter the circumstances.45  
Amnesty International too are unrelenting in their criticism: “War crimes in Iraq, and 
mounting evidence of the torture and ill-treatment of detainees in US custody in other countries, 
sent an unequivocal message to the world that human rights may be sacrificed ostensibly in the 
name of security”.46 Another aspect mentioned is the fact that six months after the US Supreme 
Court in a ruling had determined that the detainees at Guantánamo Bay fell under the jurisdiction 
of the federal courts, not one of them had been tried there. Instead, those considered to be of 
high value were kept at secret locations beyond the reach of the courts. In some cases the 
situation for the detainee even amounts to enforced disappearance.47 The general tendency, then, 
is that of the ‘War on Terror’ being a framework within which the toolbox has contained a wide 
array of available means. 
2.2 Consequences of the War Model 
A distinguishing feature of a situation described as a war is that it implies a state of emergency, 
something that in turn carries with it implications for human rights – more specifically in the 
opportunity to steer away from demands on abiding by international rules and norms. Three days 
after the 9/11-attacks President Bush declared a state of emergency, and congress authorized him 
in using all necessary force in his response.48 The war rhetoric secures special war powers. This 
declaration, however, concerns not only the constitutionally afforded powers of the President. 
An important component is the impact on public opinion, important for supporting these 
powers, that comes with a declaration of ‘war’.49 
In political practice the ‘War on Terror’ has introduced a relapse to the reasoning prominent 
during the Cold War, meaning that geopolitical interests are given priority over choices grounded 
on for example ethical considerations. Case in point is the US cooperation with Pakistan, a state 
with a dubious record concerning human rights, but valued as a partner in combating terrorism.50 
Another example is the support to the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, standing accused of 
many serious human rights violations – some of them allegedly “widespread or systematic”, that 
is, possibly amounting to crimes against humanity.51 These are clear examples of violations that 
                                                
44 Ibid., Article 4. 
45 UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11, General Comment No. 29: States of Emergency (article 4), 31 August 
2001, Para. 11. 
46 Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report 2005, p. 19. 
47 Ibid.; Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report 2006, p. 272f. 
48 Stephens, Jr., Otis H., in Cohen, David B. and Wells, John W. (eds.), p. 71. 
49 Cassese, Antonio, ‘Terrorism is Also Disrupting Some Crucial Legal Categories of International Law’, 12:5 
European Journal of International Law, p. 993. 
50 Wilson, Richard Ashby, in Wilson, Richard Ashby (ed.), p. 23. 
51 Donohue, Laura K., ‘Terrorism and the counter-terrorist discourse’, in Ramraj, Victor V., Hor, Michael and 
Roach, Kent (eds.), Global Anti-Terrorism Law and Policy, p. 17; Human Rights Watch, Military Assistance to the Afghan 
Opposition, 5 October 2001, p. 3, <http://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/asia/afghan-bck1005.pdf>  
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are purposefully ignored to serve the end goal of fighting terrorism. It is important to note that 
the alternative of simply shutting human rights violators out can also be detrimental, but working 
with them pose the risk of simply strengthening and legitimizing them. 
Some comments from judiciary institutions show the meaning of as well as opposition 
towards suggested and committed acts. The Law Lords in Britain did not accept the idea of 
practicing indefinite detention of suspects – that is, persons not sentenced to any crime, and as 
such still to be regarded as innocent – claiming that such a measure is “anathema in any country 
which observes the rule of law”.52 The meaning of that opinion is, according to Fernando Tesón, 
to show that such harsh restrictions of individual liberties would be self-defeating for a 
democratic state.53 The US Supreme Court too expressed caution, holding that “[i]t is during our 
most challenging and uncertain moments that our Nation’s commitment to due process is most 
severely tested; and it is in those times that we must preserve out commitment at home to the 
principles for which we fight abroad”.54 Giving in to the circumstances as they are presented in 
the war model of fighting terrorism carries these risks of greatly sacrificing important core values. 
One consequence of framing the fight against terrorism as a war is the simple fact that a war 
in general has two parties combating each other, and in this case it would mean that those taking 
part in this struggle using force do so with some, yet perhaps very small, legitimacy.55 This would 
render some targets for both parties of the struggle justifiable, and it is the opposite of all 
declarations made, nationally as well as internationally, regarding terrorism; the mantra is that 
terrorist acts never can be justified, no matter what. But if we are to take the war model to its 
extreme, this is the result. The general tendency and position, however, does not acknowledge 
this. 
2.2.1 Laws Potentially Misguided and Made Permanent 
A problem of counterterrorism laws has to do with the extraordinary context in which they are 
created; they are often a response to an attack.  The legislation imposed in both the US and the 
UK was enacted due to the perception that existing laws and intelligence might not amount to 
sufficient protection against new attacks. That is one of the reasons as to why they were passed 
so swiftly, and this kind of acting carries some risks. Mainly, during this short period there is no 
time for any deeper investigation to reach clarity regarding where things went wrong, where the 
weak spots that need be corrected and enforced are to be found. There is a good chance that the 
changes made with, for example, the USA PATRIOT Act, meant to strengthen the national 
security, do not address the crucial ‘loopholes’ used by the perpetrators of 9/11.56 Still, the 
legislative response is perceived as necessary, but should the above scenario be true – although it 
is difficult to assess – the risk of invasion in the civil liberties of the population becomes a much 
                                                
52 Lord Nichols of Birkenhead, as cited in Tesón, Fernando, ‘Liberal Security’, in Wilson, Richard Ashby (ed.), p. 67 
(my italics). 
53 Ibid. 
54 Hamdi case, 2004, as cited in Tesón, Fernando, in Wilson, Richard Ashby (ed.), p. 70. 
55 Warbrick, Colin, ‘The European Response to Terrorism in an Age of Terrorism’, 15:5 European Journal of 
International Law, p. 1016f. 
56 Donohue, Laura K., p. 13f. 
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more serious issue. If the reduction in rights and freedom, hypothetically, cannot be said to 
increase security – then the new extensive legislation take on the appearance of a misguided 
misuse of power. 
Another important aspect of counterterrorism law is that an established pattern shows that 
these would-be temporary provisions actually often later come to form the basis for further 
legislation, thus becoming permanent. The USA PATRIOT Act was initially presented with so-
called sunset provisions, set to expire on 31 December 2005, on its most intrusive aspects. 
However, in July that year they were renewed and as of five years after being passed, fourteen of 
the sixteen most intrusive provisions had been made permanent. Moreover, the 2006 USA 
PATRIOT Improvement Act widened the original scope and to its powers added anti-drug 
measures unrelated to the terrorist threat. The same pattern has also been shown in the UK, 
where the situation in Northern Ireland resulted in almost hundred years of continuing, and 
eventually making permanent, many ‘temporary’ laws.57 The domestic situation changes 
drastically with the new legislation – changes that most likely will last. 
2.2.2 Global Consequences 
The ‘War on Terror’ causes damage to the international legal and institutional system. As a result 
of being associated with the measures carried out the legitimacy of the UN is challenged. 
Furthermore, the actions of the main actors themselves in some cases worsen this situation. In 
2005 the US National Defense Strategy made the grave claim that “our strength as a nation state 
will continue to be challenged by those who employ a strategy of the weak using international 
fora, judicial processes, and terrorism”, the substance of which equates international cooperation 
and the principles of the rule of law with terrorism itself as a threat to the national security.58 
Judging by such assessments, the war model holds no place for human rights as a part of the 
counterterrorism strategy. 
One conclusion drawn from the European Parliamentary Assembly investigations of the US 
High Value Detention programme – wherein renditions of detainees and the usage of secret 
detention facilities have been frequent – is that it carries with it collateral damage in the form of 
potentially diminished respect for human rights globally. It creates a greater danger in that others 
may us this American model to legitimize their own similar actions, making the US a ‘negative 
role model’.59 One illustrative example of the attraction of US policies is Colombia’s redefining of 
its long internal conflict as a part of the global ‘War on Terror’, thus inserting their own counter-
insurgency efforts into that paradigm.60 By following the path of the main actors in the world 
greater legitimacy, or at least acquiescence, is more easily achieved; the shadow behind the US is a 
great place to hide. The lack of respect for human rights spreads to other actor seeing potential 
gains with this model. 
                                                
57 Ibid., p. 2, 14f.  
58 Department of Defense, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, March 2005, as cited in Cole, David, 
and Lobel, Jules, p. 16. 
59 Council of Europe, CIA above the law? Secret detentions and unlawful inter-state transfers of detainees in Europe, p. 237, Para. 
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2.3 Balancing Liberty and Security 
The type of actions presented above, being a response to terrorist attacks, is based on an attitude 
that there seems to be some necessity in limiting the civil liberties of the populace in order to 
prevent new attacks. The model for this view usually is that of a balancing act, where liberty is 
weighed against security. A reduction in liberties means an increase in security, and vice versa. 
The ideal aim is to find the middle way “between the individual’s liberty to do as he pleases and 
society’s need for protection against the harm that may accrue from some of the things it might 
please an individual to do”.61 In other words this can be posed as a dilemma, where unlimited 
freedom poses a risk that has to be countered by imposing limitations that creates a sufficient 
amount of societal and individual security. At the same time too much control and limitations is 
rarely seen as something positive.  
The imagery is also used as public promotion for the proposed measures. The US Attorney 
General at the time, John Ashcroft, advocated the USA PATRIOT Act by claiming that it 
“provide[s] the security that ensures liberty”62 and attacked its opponents by saying: “[T]o those 
who scare peace-loving people with phantoms of lost liberty, my message is this: your tactics only 
aid terrorists, for they erode our national unity and diminish our resolve”.63 There is no mistaking 
that security is the main priority, and the reason is instrumental: liberty might have to take the 
back seat until order has been restored – this to guarantee liberty. There is an obvious paradox in 
this reasoning when interpreted in this way. The image of balance, and especially its components, 
might well need a more thorough investigation. 
2.3.1 Obscurities in the Language of Balance 
Jeremy Waldron emphasises the importance of scrutinizing the image and rhetoric of balance, for 
four reasons. First, the talk of balance rests on a consequentialist thinking that is hard to 
reconcile with civil liberties. More specifically, the rights these liberties are associated with are 
usually given a status above being used as mere tools of utility. Second, justice requires that the 
proposed changes be closely watched, due to the risk of the decrease in liberty affecting some 
more than others and the changes thus being unevenly distributed. Third, the reduction in 
liberties and its parallel increase in the power of the state – to be used to fight terrorism – can 
also result in adverse effects, such as diminished security for the individual against the state. The 
result, then, might either way be harm caused for the society’s members. Finally, the reduction in 
liberty must be sure to have the desired effects, or at least be based on decent certainty regarding 
the extent of the probability of that effect. Often this is not the case, resulting in vagueness 
concerning whether something is achieved that is worth sacrificing liberty for.64 To sum up, these 
aspects show how the pragmatic take on the balance, guided by perceived necessity, brings forth 
risks of serious implications for human rights. Richard Ashby Wilson agrees, stating that such a 
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62 Then Attorney General John Ashcroft, August 25 2003, as cited in Sidel, Mark, p. 10. 
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utilitarian pragmatism is as philosophically and politically far away from an ethics of universal 
human rights one can come.65 
One major problem with the supposed balance is that its underlying logic places security and 
liberty in an oppositional relationship; an increase in the one causes a decrease in the other. 
However, as emphasized by Tesón, in a democracy these values are in fact complementary. As 
such the purpose of a response to an emergency must be to preserve the freedoms – which de 
facto are the distinguishing trait of the democracy itself. This, and only this, can justify emphasized 
security measures.66 Evident here is, actually, the very consequentialist thinking criticized above, 
however in a more restricted and value based fashion. The reduction in liberties is seen as a 
means to certain ends, but the motives are not simply an emphasis on security per se, as an 
intrinsic value – which is what causes the risks described above, and furthermore makes abuse a 
greater possibility. Instead, liberty is to be given the upper hand and serve as the justification. 
This, in the end, seems to better safeguard the liberties. 
An aspect mentioned by Waldron above but otherwise, according to Daniel Moeckli, often 
absent in discussions on balance is the distribution of the freedom that is being weighed. The 
general assumption merely is that everyone is equally affected by the measures pondered. Quite 
the opposite, the reality is that the balance might be between the majority’s security and the 
liberty of only a minority.67 The military commissions mentioned above, and their non-
applicability on American citizens, is an example of this reasoning, proving that it is not merely a 
hypothetical objection. John Walker Lindh, ‘the American Taliban’, was indicted and sentenced in 
a civilian criminal court although having been arrested in Afghanistan together with many foreign 
Taliban fighters and viewed as an enemy combatant. The difference in treatment after the capture 
was explained with him being an American citizen. With the commissions, then, the rights and 
liberties of suspected non-citizens, a minority, are sacrificed to achieve security for the majority, 
the citizens.68 This is the core of the risks posed with a utilitarian approach towards the balancing 
of values; its conflict with the egalitarian, non-discriminatory foundation of human rights is 
obvious. If the choice shall be, as David Cole and Jules Lobel suggests, not about liberty or 
security, “but between effective security measures and counterproductive ones”69, the objections 
above need to be taken into account when making the calculation. Also, they should be 
thoroughly compared to alternative models and their prospects of success. 
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67 Moeckli, Daniel, Human rights and non-discrimination in the 'War on terror', p. 2-5. 
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3 An Alternative Counterterrorism Model 
A great deal of the existing literature on this subject makes the point that the protection of 
human rights must form the basis of all counterterrorist activities. Analogous to the sentiment of 
Kofi Annan cited in chapter 1, with talk of human rights as essential tools against terrorism, they 
are seen as important because “they are an indispensable component of the liberal democratic 
politics required in emergency situations”.70 However, as shown in the previous chapter, a major 
feature of recent and current counterterrorism actions has been the curtailment of principles of 
civil and political rights and liberties at home – all in the name of security – and the violation of 
human rights abroad. Given the frequently made claims of the importance of these rights, this 
should be seen as giving the terrorists a major victory as well as strengthening them by way of 
more recruits and perceived legitimacy.71 This is what Schmid calls the ‘terrorist trap’ – the 
calculation from the terrorists’ point of view that the response to their acts will be an 
overreaction, which in turn will serve their own purpose of greater mobilization. In this trap, he 
claims, “we will not be caught if we adhere to the principles of the rule of law, respect for human 
rights and minimal and proportionate use of force”.72 These points paint a picture of the war 
model being very risky should it not prove successful, and this ought to be a good starting point 
for an alternative strategy: to uphold these basic principles is to not continue playing into the 
terrorists’ hands. 
3.1 Contrasting the War Model 
Jane Boulden and Thomas G. Weiss pose the simple yet very important question that, as a 
reaction to terrorist attacks, “would it not be preferable to develop other responses that dealt 
with the motivation and issues that prompted those attacks? […] The attractiveness of this 
approach is that it offers some prospect of a response that might be preventive in ways other 
than the application of military force”.73 I would describe it as acting proactively, rather than 
merely actively, to a greater extent in the response, and this turns the spotlight effectively on the 
prevention model of the ‘War on Terror’ highlighting what is one of the main issues of this 
paper: what, really, is an effective model for counterterrorism? The same concern is expressed by 
Kennedy Graham, who describes terrorism as a global ill-health and proposes that as such it 
should be treated – not simply suppressed.74 Here too focus is put on the syndrome as a whole 
rather than its visible signs, and, hence, these writers are looking for an alternative to the war 
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model. Furthermore, the war model is seen as counterproductive, which to Graham also is the 
reason to why this ‘war’ cannot be won: because “it has no identifiable foe or value-based 
objective”.75 It is not suiting for the phenomenon of terrorism, or the process of combating it, to 
call it a ‘war’ because of the many discrepancies in their characteristics. Thus some deem it an 
obvious misnomer.76 The ‘War on Terror’ is not a traditional war and thus cannot be expected to 
end with a victory on the battlefield, if there is one, followed by the winner forcing political terms 
upon the defeated. Instead the victory will depend on political changes ultimately resulting in a 
lack of support for the ideology and strategy of the terrorists.77 It is a natural consequence of 
framing the struggle as a war that the end goal becomes victory, but in the case of terrorism such 
a ‘victory’ can be hard to define and therefore has to be re-conceptualized. One way to do this is 
to move focus to human rights. In the UN Global Strategy, which I turn to next, human rights 
are not only helpful but in fact essential to combat terrorism. 
3.2 The UN Global Strategy 
On 20 September 2006 the UN General Assembly adopted ‘The United Nations Global 
Counter-Terrorism Strategy’, consisting of a resolution with an annexed plan of action.78 Its 
foundation is an earlier report of the Secretary-General wherein five pillars are presented as 
suggested elements of a counterterrorism strategy: “dissuading people from resorting to terrorism 
or supporting it; denying terrorists the means to carry out an attack; deterring States from 
supporting terrorism; developing State capacity to defeat terrorism; and defending human 
rights”.79 These pillars had their foundation in yet another previous report80, and were by 
member states’ request further developed into forming the proposed basis of a strategy.81 With 
the recommendations from the Secretary-General as a guiding document the Global Strategy 
contains many of the same notions and it establishes a comprehensive approach towards 
combating terrorism, the content of which is presented in detail below. 
3.2.1 The Provisions of the Global Strategy 
The key phrases to capture the aim and core mentality of the Global Strategy are found in its 
preamble, asserting the General Assembly as “[r]ecognizing that development, peace and security, 
and human rights are interlinked and mutually reinforcing”, and to this “[b]earing in mind the 
need to address the conditions conducive of the spread of terrorism”.82 This is furthermore to be 
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understood in relation to the claim that what marks terrorism is its aim at the destruction of 
human rights.83 The idea, then, is that to support and work for human rights is to oppose 
terrorism, and that measures must be undertaken focusing on all the ‘mutually reinforcing’ 
aspects. 
The annexed plan of action consist – besides a general introduction in which the member 
states condemn terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and agree to take joint action to 
counter it – of four annexes that make up the pillars of the proposed model of counterterrorism. 
The five pillars presented by the Secretary-General have thus been condensed into four. Annex I 
focuses on how to address conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism. The enumeration of 
such conditions mentions, inter alia, prolonged unresolved conflicts, lack of the rule of law, 
human rights violations, ethnic, national and religious discrimination, socio-economic 
marginalization and lack of good governance.84 This is interesting since, as presented above, the 
‘War on Terror’ has to a great extent so far been marked by examples of human rights violations, 
the setting aside of the rule of law and, it can be argued, elements of ethnic discrimination. It is 
beyond doubt, then, that in the eyes of the Global Strategy the ‘War on Terror’ contains elements 
that contribute to the spread of terrorism. Ergo, the Global Strategy implies that the ‘War on 
Terror’ is counterproductive. The proposed measures to correct this include promoting a culture 
of religious tolerance and respect, justice and human development, through education and public 
awareness programmes; to ensure the realization of the Millennium Development Goals to 
eradicate poverty and come to terms with marginalization; and to within the UN system through 
cooperation give higher priority to human rights and good governance.85 All in all, the prevention 
of terrorism by removing its foundation of recruitment means bottom-up strengthening. 
Annex II presents measures to prevent and combat terrorism. Member states shall not 
organize, participate in, or let their territories be used for terrorist activity. They shall cooperate 
fully with one another, exchange information, and ensure that perpetrators are arrested and then 
either prosecuted or extradited. Efforts shall be made to impede terrorists’ movement over 
borders, as well as the traffic in arms.86 
Annex III concerns building state capacity in counterterrorism, and to strengthen the role of 
the UN. This is viewed as a core element of the entire strategy, and is to be developed by 
encouraging state contributions to UN cooperation. Furthermore states should make use of 
established best practices from different organizations and also encourage and improve the work 
of existing UN organs on this subject.87 
Annex IV contains measures for asserting the respect of human rights and the rule of law as 
the foundation for counterterrorism. Herein is recognized that effective counterterrorism and the 
protection of human rights are aspects complementing each other. This means that all efforts 
undertaken must be in accordance with state obligations under international law, and an effective 
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criminal justice system based on the rule of law must be developed. To promote these efforts the 
UN is said to play an important role, and as such its human rights bodies should be supported.88 
The framework established in the Global Strategy is very extensive. It contains measures to 
combat terrorism, like those of resolution 1373, but distinguishes itself by working on many 
levels and focusing on what causes terrorism in the first place, in contrast with the war model’s 
military solutions. This makes for a more holistic approach that also weighs in development 
through the mentioning of the Millennium Development Goals. 
3.2.2 The Role of the United Nations 
Security Council resolution 1373, as was presented above, makes very modest mentioning of the 
human rights aspect of counterterrorism. Furthermore, the Counter-Terrorism Committee, 
created by that resolution and responsible for its implementation, has been criticized for its poor 
work of enforcing human rights.89 Resolution 1373 has instead distinguished itself in that it for 
the first time in a resolution, under a Chapter VII-mandate, imposed obligations on the member 
states in a broad-reaching context, that is, not directed at one particular country or event.90 The 
significance in this, according to Paul C. Szasz, is that the ‘traditional’ practice of this mandate 
has been to use Chapter VII to pressure member states to compliance in a more limited context. 
In that usage the Council’s decision cannot be said to establish new rules of international law.91 
1373, on the other hand, with no limits regarding context or time, can almost be seen as law 
making. It must be said, then, that it is a powerful resolution. 
The Global Strategy is distinguished from Security Council resolutions not only in terms of 
its broader ambitions. An important aspect to consider is the difference in roles and 
responsibilities between the Security Council and the General Assembly, the latter of which being 
the creator of the Global Strategy. 
The General Assembly has a different role, and in this context it entails an expectation to 
administering the policy guidelines concerning terrorism.92 It lacks authority to command 
member states’ governments to do certain things. Thus, being the only body dealing with this 
kind of global issues, in a forum where virtually all states are represented, is serves a better role 
developing the normative discourse for international policies; it is about collective legitimization 
or delegitimization.93 What is legitimized in this case, with this development, is the emphasis on 
human rights in combating terrorism. 
In practice, these distinguishing marks of the General Assembly boil down to a more 
proactive, and also progressive, role to play in global counterterrorism. A partial explanation to 
his can be found in that the preamble to the Global Strategy reaffirms the role of the General 
Assembly according to the UN Charter. This role means promoting human rights and 
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fundamental freedoms for all94 – a work that all member states pledge to cooperate with95 – 
which is evident in the Global Strategy.  
An interesting aspect of General Assembly activity lately is that resolutions titled ‘Protection 
of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism’ have been adopted at the 
General Assembly’s regular sessions for seven consecutive years – from the first at the 57th 
session, to the latest in the 63rd session last year.96 This is worth noting. Before, the General 
Assembly resolutions on the subject of terrorism had for a long time focused on measures to 
eliminate it, with the occasional acknowledgment of the connection between terrorism and 
human rights. However, the strong emphasis on the need to protect human rights in countering 
terrorism is a new phenomenon. This is the context in which the Global Strategy has been 
created. The General Assembly can with new resolutions serve as an indicator of change in 
policies, and for identification of new issues.97 As a whole this new direction should arguably, 
given its timing and perseverance, be understood as a reaction to the measures undertaken in the 
‘War on Terror’. 
3.3 Striving for ‘Sustainable Security’ 
The former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, agrees with the 
objections against the ‘War on Terror’, concerning its implications for human rights. Since order 
and security has trumped all other concerns, measures since 9/11 in her eyes has meant a 
sacrifice of fundamental rights and freedoms to fight terrorism. Because of this an alternative is 
needed, and although the restoration of human rights and the rule of law is a necessary starting 
point, it is not sufficient. Counterterrorist measures have to go deeper and aim to address the 
root causes to the situation in which people more easily become susceptible to recruitment.98 Her 
proposed model is one that needs to bring about a shift in the mindset, widening the concept of 
security and focusing on human security and its relations to human rights and human 
development. One key measure is building bottom-up to empower people to being able to secure 
their own lives.99  
A comparable concept is one in which counterterrorism constitute only one of a variety of 
necessary models of combating terrorism and achieving safety. This too, like Robinson’s broader 
concept of security, is a complex phenomenon and thus suggests another approach. Focus is put 
on efforts to eliminate poverty, the struggle against HIV/AIDS, disarmament, and the like.100  
The two concepts above are examples of the line of thought evident in the works of the 
Oxford Research Group in their project for a ‘sustainable security’. In their view the threats the 
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world is facing is built of four interconnected trends: climate change, competition over resources, 
marginalization of the majority world, and global militarization. The ‘War on Terror’ is a part of 
this but has, as they claim, hijacked the agenda of global security – and done so with the wrong 
methods, thinking about security in terms of defence. The model they propose as an alternative 
contains extensive long-term measures undertaken to reach solution to all four-problem areas. As 
such it is described as preventative through attacking the roots of the problems instead of trying 
to control them militarily when it is already possibly too late.101 
These different models construing alternatives to the ‘War on Terror’ have a common 
denominator in that counterterrorism must be a more extensive, better planned, long-term 
project. They are also, in content, closely related to the Global Strategy; the contain many of the 
same ideas. Notable among these is the focus on resources, with the aim to counter terrorism by 
eradicating poverty. This is an important aspect in making the models sustainable – by not 
regarding terrorism as something that simply is or happens. Effective measures focus on the 
reasons why it may occur. 
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4 A Troublesome Shift From the War Model 
What needs to be done in moving from the ‘War on Terror’ to the Global Strategy is to change 
the mindset and investigate what the objectives of the fight against terrorism should be. This 
necessitates a shift in perspectives, away from militarily trying to control and eliminate terrorism 
now, to working for removing its foundations and thus focusing on the long-term results. If there 
is truth, namely, behind the claims that the war model is counterproductive – then the alternative 
model is essential. Sergio Vieira de Mello was clear on this point: “Fundamental grievances, 
embedded in a denial of human rights and basic justice, must be addressed if we are to ensure 
that terrorist groups cannot cloak their acts with a spurious veil of justification. […] [A]n all-
encompassing approach is required.  Human rights can help provide such a framework”.102 Why 
is this in practice so problematic? The issues are a lack of long-term perspective and goals, as well 
as misdirected political objectives in the process resulting in a lack of cooperation and coherence. 
4.1 Long-Term Emergencies 
Initially, after 9/11, the situation was declared as a state of emergency, and the response was 
shaped accordingly. The UK, as mentioned above, derogated from the ECHR and the US fell 
just short of a similar response, explicitly declaring a state of emergency but making no formal 
derogations from the ICCPR.103 A problem and troubling aspect is that the diffuse ‘war’ and its 
vague time frames cause a risk of creating a permanent state of emergency. As mentioned in 
chapter 2, efforts, like legislation, meant to be temporary become permanent and the foundation 
on which new laws are based. The result of such a pattern is that the exception becomes the 
norm.104  
The discussion on long-term or short-term measures contains a major paradox. The 
emphasis in the ‘War on Terror’ on national security is arguably based on a long-term notion of 
security. However, when this is used to justify the short-term reduction in individual liberties the 
paradox occurs and the potential for government abuse increases.105 When adding to this 
equation the fact that the short-term interferences often become permanent and established as 
the new normal, a widely problematic situation is created. The short-sightedness of the ‘War on 
Terror’ becomes ever so evident. 
In reviewing the answer to this notion some note the tendency to instead describe the 
present situation as a “long war against islamofascism”, partly from the Bush administration itself 
                                                
102 Sergio Vieira de Mello, then UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Address to the Counter-Terrorism 
Committee, 21 October 2002, available at <http://www.un.org/sc/ctc/documents/HC.htm>  
103 Duffy, Helen, p. 347. 
104 Ibid., p. 346. 
105 Joyner, Christopher C., ‘The United Nations and Terrorism: Rethinking Legal Tensions Between National 
Security, Human Rights, and Civil Liberties’, 5 International Studies Perspectives, p. 252. 
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in justifying the extended efforts.106 With such phrasing any mentioning of short-term goals 
should be seen as void; this is not a swift state-of-emergency-retaliation. It seems that the ‘War 
on Terror’ today finds itself in an involuntary long-term project, still using short-term means. 
One way to structure it would be better coherence in the framework of law. 
4.2 Defining ‘Terrorism’ 
Reaching an agreement upon a common definition of terrorism has proven to be an immensely 
difficult task. It is a problematic situation that is illustrated by the fact that one can discern at least 
109 possible definitions having been put forward over the years.107 This has been part of the 
process, the Sisyphean task still in progress, aiming to create a comprehensive convention 
covering terrorism as a whole. The process started in the 1930s and reached its first and major 
accomplishment under the guise of the League of Nations, in the 1937 Convention for the 
Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism. The convention, however, was never adopted and thus 
never entered into force. According to Helen Duffy this was due to problems with reaching a 
consensus on the definition of the term.108 Arguably, though, the timing should also be 
mentioned. The outbreak of the Second World War inevitably placed such discussions on a 
definition in the shadows and the League of Nations in the waste bin of history. 
Since the 1960s conventions on specific aspects of terrorism have been created, and there 
are today thirteen international conventions (to be distinguished from the additional regional 
ones).109 These provide a framework of prohibitions of certain separated aspects of what is 
perceived as terrorism. They all define only the specific acts of terrorism relevant for the 
purposes of each convention; no general definition of terrorism is presented. In the 1970s, 
however, work on a generic definition was once again initiated, by means of a 1972 ad hoc 
committee of the UN General Assembly. The purpose of the committee was to consider a draft 
comprehensive convention. However, at that time in history, in the new reality of global politics 
that emerged with the process of decolonization, there was such a strong division between 
member states regarding the status of national liberation movements that no such draft could be 
agreed upon. The issue was that of including or excluding these movements from the scope of 
the convention.110 Instead of reaching consensus the process of creating specific conventions 
continued. 
In 1994 there was some success with the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate 
International Terrorism, which was approved and included in a General Assembly resolution the 
same year.111 This resolution was then ‘recalled’ by subsequent resolutions, wherein the 
                                                
106 Rogers, Paul, Why We’re Losing the War on Terror, p. 119. 
107 Duffy, Helen, p. 17f. 
108 Ibid. 18f. 
109 ‘International Instruments to Counter Terrorism’, at <http://un.org/terrorism/instruments.shtml> Examples 
are the 1979 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages and the 2005 International Convention for the 
Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. 
110 Duffy, Helen, p. 19. 
111 Ibid.; UN Doc. A/RES/49/60, 9 December 1994.  
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declaration’s definition of terrorism was also reiterated. It reads: “Criminal acts intended or 
calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular 
persons for political purposes […]”.112 Given these repeated assertions, this definition can be said 
to represent a recognizable level of unity, albeit not in a binding document or a convention.  
Following the above mentioned resolutions another ad hoc committee has been working on a 
draft comprehensive convention. Disagreement today concerns the draft treaty articles regarding, 
still, the definition and its relation to national liberation movements, as well as possible 
exemptions for a state’s armed forces when performing their duties.113 From within the drafting 
process the latter is seen as the key aspect constituting the obstacle towards reaching 
consensus.114 
The closest thing to a generic definition yet to date to be found in an international 
convention exists in the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of Financing of 
Terrorism. It defines a terrorist act as one “intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a 
civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed 
conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or 
to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any 
act”.115 However, this definition is only implicit and not intended as a general definition, since the 
convention only prohibits the providing or collecting funding for the described act.116 Deduced 
from this is the conclusion that since the funding of those acts is prohibited, and the purpose of 
the convention is to prohibit financing of terrorism, specifically, the described act must logically 
constitute terrorism. This is all but set in stone, though, but being a definition of a general sort, 
that has survived all the way through the drafting process and its negotiations, it is a great 
approximation of what a generic definition could – and might – look like. 
4.2.1 The Issue of Agency 
Some definitions focus on the perpetrator for the determination of the act. This has close ties 
with the issue of including or excluding acts of the military forces, as acts of states are not always 
associated with terrorism. Ranstorp and Wilkinson stipulate the purpose of terrorism as aiming to 
create “a climate of fear among a wider group than the immediate victims of the violence, often 
to publicise a cause, as well as to coerce a target into acceding to terrorist aims”.117 This latter part 
could be true of both the terrorist act and the response to it, and the writers acknowledge 
terrorism as a form of means that can be used by states as a part of their foreign or domestic 
policy.118 The same point is being made in the 1994 Declaration on Measures to Eliminate 
                                                
112 UN Doc. A/RES/49/60, 9 December 1994, Article 3; UN Doc. A/RES/50/53, 29 January 1996, Article 2; UN 
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International Terrorism.119 This is, however, not always an obvious point to make. The US only 
acknowledges states as sponsors of terrorism, of which they keep a list, and not as 
perpetrators.120 Consequently, the definition in the U.S. Code is more limited than the ones 
presented above. The aim is still said to influence an audience, but the act is defined as 
“[p]remeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-
national groups or clandestine agents”.121 This puts as much emphasis on the actor as it does the 
act. The issue of terrorism, then, becomes an issue about the perpetrators – the terrorist groups – 
rather than terrorism as a whole. This idea is connected to the claim made that these groups all 
share a common denominator: they are weaker than their enemies, which is the reason they 
choose the method of terrorism to achieve their goals.122 Interestingly, this latter part about 
choosing the method acknowledges that terrorism is in fact a tool – but according to the 
conditions presented in the definition only if certain actors make use of the tool. This has 
political implications. The terrorists are by virtue of their acts separated as something other than 
for example military acts with similar results; terrorism and counterterrorism do not share 
characteristics.   
Contrary to the reasoning above, some authors acknowledge the relationship between 
terrorism and its counterpart. In this view they are to a certain extent identical. For example both, 
generally speaking and traditionally performed, involve violence, fear and influence a larger 
audience. Also, they are purposive, political acts that affect non-combatants.123 It is partly this 
closeness between terrorism and its counterpart that causes the problems of definition. The 
neglect of this relationship, evident in the exclusion of state action in the definitions, is said by 
Jordan J. Paust to be part of the problem. It is not as much due to the acts themselves, they can 
still fall within the range of other regulations, as it is because of the message this behaviour sends 
out. In Paust’s view, by saying that what states do cannot amount to terrorism, the state elites 
creating the conventions through their negotiations are playing into the hands of the potential 
non-state terrorists witnessing the act. It reads as the states trying to regulate this kind of acts by 
excluding their own use of them from the definition.124 The power to do so comes with states’ 
control over the application of the term ‘terrorism’. State acts are either interpreted differently, 
seen through the perspectives of was or national self-defence, or simply hidden in innovative 
language with terms like ‘coercive diplomacy’.125 This makes room for arbitrariness, and the 
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consequence is a major lack of legitimacy and policies bringing about a risk of being or becoming 
counterproductive.  
4.2.2 Working Without a Definition 
In the absence of an agreed upon generic definition, or a comprehensive convention, the fight 
against terrorism is either coined in the terminology of the specific conventions, or by simply 
referring to ‘terrorism’ with no further elaboration provided. The UN Security Council resolution 
1373 is a case of the latter.126 What are the consequences of laying down these obligations for the 
member states to combat terrorism when there is no general agreement on what constitutes 
terrorism? Something that has been noted is the obvious risk of a lack of coherence in the efforts 
of all member states following the principles of the resolution; the lack of a common definition 
leaves it up to the states themselves to define the term and the act.127 This semi-coordinated 
network of domestic definitions pose a significant obstacle to achieving results, which is the 
reason behind the view of Gerhard Hafner, that an agreed upon common definition is the key to 
enabling real international cooperation.128 With the importance given to the common definition 
in this reasoning, it becomes so essential as to be regarded as the sine qua non of a joint 
international struggle against terrorism. 
The potential risks of working without a definition are presented by the UN Special 
Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while 
countering terrorism, in his first report to the UN Commission on Human Rights. This causes 
incoherence that might in turn result in adverse effects for human rights – as a result to deliberate 
misuse of the term, and in the form of unintended abuses through legitimizing the conduct of 
oppressive regimes combating what they dub ‘terrorism’.129  
Worth noting is that the lack of a common definition does not mean that acts of terrorism 
can elude punishment. The specific conventions cover and prohibit many aspects of terrorist 
acts, and thus form a net that ‘captures’ many terrorist acts – given that the deed is committed on 
the territory of a state party to the particular convention, and that the state also fulfils this 
commitment. Further, even in the absence of a criminalization of terrorism per se, those types of 
violent acts are usually covered by national legislation prohibiting murder, or other attacks on 
people and property.130 The issue is rather of cooperation. 
4.3 Inconsistency in Political Will 
The evidence thus far as to political will among the international community tells of forceful 
actions from the Security Council, which is of great influence given its status and power. As 
shown above the framework established through resolution 1373 is still central to the 
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129 UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/98, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, 28 December 2005, Para. 27. 
130 Hafner, Gerhard, in Nesi, Giuseppe (ed.), p. 41ff. 
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international struggle against terrorism. And within that framework, human rights play only a 
peripheral role.  
Moving on to the General Assembly, the wide recognition throught the adoption of the 
Global Strategy legitimacy in these policies. However, as already described only the Security 
Council have the power of creating mandatory provisions. There is a revealing discrepancy here, 
in the fact that the Global Strategy has been adopted, together with repeated General Assembly 
resolutions on the subject, but in terms of the Security Council decisions not much has 
happened. It seems that the political will, at least among the major, norm-setting members 
stretches more easily to comprehensive suggestions when they do not require obedience.  
Problems relating to political will are also evident in the discussions concerning a definition. 
The obstacles seem to consist of protection of state interest from the members feeling they have 
something to lose in changing the direction. The major military powers steer away from 
propositions that might prove to become a limitation on military practice further ahead. 
The two models are evidence of political will to both fight terrorism – the expressions of it – 
and to erase it through human rights and development. The difference is the status of the 
international forums emphasizing the different models, where the Security Council of course 
have the greatest power. However, it must not be neglected that state practice has shown a will to 
handle this issue independently, which has meant following neither model very strictly and 
ignoring important principles of human rights. 
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5 The Time Factor 
Kofi Annan has stated that since terrorist acts by nature are serious human rights violations, the 
practice of sacrificing these rights to achieve security is merely “shortsighted, self-contradictory, 
and, in the long run, self-defeating”.131 It is the emphasis on the long run that is especially worth 
acknowledging. The time factor is greatly missing in the policies in counterterrorism measures. In 
Security Council resolution 1373 no time period for the proposed plan of action is given. That is 
part of its broad reach – not only in terms of the general framework that is not related to any 
specific situation, but evidently also regarding the time frame of the measures. On the other 
hand, the time period implied in an alternative model such as the Global Strategy is by default 
much longer. The purpose is still prevention, but by non-coercive means and by building from 
the bottom-up, trying to erase the factors ‘creating’ terrorism in the first place. It will, of course, 
not disappear completely, but another kind of prevention could lead to a situation where at least 
the risk is manageable – and not increasing with every effort to prevent it. This would reduce the 
risks of reaping what is sowed in terms of a backlash of recruitment. 
5.1 Costs and Adverse Effects 
Several references have now been made emphasizing the fundamental role of human rights in 
counterterrorism. On reason behind this is the adverse effects of the ‘War on Terror’ that are 
more likely with every abuse and violation committed. The risk is of creating more terrorists as a 
response to the flawed counterterrorism. This is a general idea that is illustrated by a specific 
example; the results of the 2003 invasion of Iraq. This was a pre-emptive war motivated inter alia 
by Saddam Hussein’s alleged possession and development of weapons of mass destruction, as 
well as a claimed linkage between Hussein and al Qaeda. Both of these were at the time dubious, 
and have been proven wrong.132 Still, the goal of countering terrorism has remained throughout, 
catalyzed by the increased activity by terrorists and insurgents in Iraq. The goal thus became to 
stabilize the region to prevent future terrorism. In light of this it must be considered a major 
failure that the claimed existence of al Qaeda-affiliated groups in Iraq has become a reality only 
after the invasion. In December 2004 insurgent leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi publicly declared 
his affiliation to al Qaeda, as evidence of the terrorist organization’s de facto presence in Iraq. 
This event is given an even stronger symbolism in the claim by Wilson that al-Zarqawi previously 
was a sworn rival to Osama bin Laden.133 Uniting against the common enemy becomes a unifying 
factor, and the adverse effects of the counterterrorism measures are evident. This scenario is a 
case in point of the ‘terrorist trap’. 
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 28 
 
 
The practice of the US today has parallels with British actions in Northern Ireland, where 
the issues were largely the same. Thus the lessons from previous experiences could be useful, and 
where necessary choose another direction, but instead “[t]he U.S. is doing what the British did in 
the nineteen seventies, detaining people and violating their civil liberties. It did nothing but 
exacerbate the situation”.134 Once again, a risk of the ‘terrorist trap’. 
Critics emphasize these adverse effects resulting from flawed counterterrorism policies. In 
the point of view of Cole and Lobel the ‘War on Terror’ has done little else than hurting the US, 
making them more vulnerable due to useful resources being spent on inefficient measures. 
“Obsessed with playing offense, [the Bush administration] has failed to put up a good 
defense”.135 The model has been to spend more per day in Iraq than what is done annually on 
some of the most important homeland security measures, where arguably national security could 
be seriously strengthened. Precisely this aspect is also the reason why the US policies are awarded 
poor grades in these areas in the report of the 9-11 Commission.136 An analogy of that argument 
can very well be drawn and projected on the international level as well, albeit the alternative 
measures to the inefficient spending focusing on development and capacity building instead. 
A practical issue causing negative results is the difficulty of bringing to justice a person that 
has been subject to coercive interrogation or torture. Any evidence gathered under such 
circumstances is considered tainted and would not be accepted in an ordinary, civilian court. This 
was the case of US citizen José Padilla, originally accused of terrorism but eventually tried for 
very thin and unrelated charges. The lack of evidence meant that there was no case for a terrorist 
trial; the reason was that existing evidence was gathered through coercive interrogation.137 It is a 
dilemma of not being able to detain people forever, with increasing unpopularity, and at the same 
time not being able to bring them to justice elsewhere. That is, if one cannot accept the fact the 
justice sought in many cases actually has to mean releasing the detainee.  
The registration and preventive detention mentioned above had no visible effects pertaining 
to their purpose of preventing terrorism. This means no gains, but all the more risks for 
presumably adverse effects due to a damaged legitimacy such acts cause, and the reaction they 
spur. The adverse effects lie in the reactions to measures perceived by other actors as wrongful. 
5.2 A Projection Over Time 
The negative consequences of adverse effects multiplied over time, presuming that the existing 
measures continue, results in a grim projection of the future situation. Both inefficiency and 
counterproductivity add up to a negative result – this being the worst case estimation of a 
continuation of the ‘War on Terror’. Still seven years into this ‘war’ few success stories have been 
produced. This is in fact a sound pessimist argument for the Global Strategy: even if calculating 
with a protracted efficiency flaw, having trouble reaching positive results, the nature of the 
measures characteristic of the Global Strategy at least reduces the risk of stepping into the 
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‘terrorist trap’. This is an alternative to the war model, where the search for an expedient solution 
to the security issues at hand has started to pose risks of only creating more trouble and less 
security along the way. What must be emphasized is the focus on the long-term perspective, 
evident in the Global Strategy’s character of striving to be sustainable. To achieve this the 
measures must be lasting, which requires planning and the wider approach. 
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6 Conclusions 
In investigating the costs and adverse effects of international counterterrorism, this paper has 
found that the distinguishing tendencies of the ‘War on Terror’ has been wide-reaching anti-
terror legislation and surveillance, resulting in a decrease in civil liberties at home. To this is 
added preventive detention with implications of racial profiling. Abroad human rights have been 
violated through indefinite detention, the use of torture, a lack of the rule of law and principles of 
due process. There has been a lack of long-term perspectives, and misdirected political objectives 
in the process has lead to a lack of cooperation and coherence With all these results, positive 
aspects are difficult to calculate leaving negative effects perhaps easier estimated. The questions is 
also how possible positive effects should be viewed in light of their costs; it is not generally 
accepted, although practice might sometimes imply it, that any means are legitimate in this 
struggle. 
It is clear that egregious acts are damaging to the legitimacy of the counterterrorism 
measures, weakening the human rights system, and might create a backlash in time. Behind these 
measures lies a dominant focus on national security, which I argue has come pose risks of 
increasing international insecurity. The underlying reasons, as I have presented in this paper, is 
the lack of long-term goals. Speedy solutions have been given primacy over efforts to achieve 
efficiency through the consistency and predictability of abiding by the rules. Here lies the strength 
of the Global Strategy – in the emphasis on building bottom-up and addressing the root causes 
of terrorism in a wider, more thoroughly planned, long-term perspective. 
A troubling aspect is how to actually measure security, and this is why there is a question 
mark in the title of this paper. All actors are trying to play it safe, striving for security. But when 
acts might have a bigger chance of causing the opposite, becoming counterproductive, this aspect 
is all but evident. The security of the ‘War on Terror’ must thus be questioned, and for this the 
sustainability of the Global Strategy is an important alternative. 
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